THE HISTORY

OF

9 ARMY GROUP

ROYAL ARTILLERY.

Extract from an address

made by

Field Marshal

Sir Bernard L Montgomery GCB DSO

to a conference of Artillery Officers in GERMANY on 27 Jun 45

    "I would like to pay a compliment to all gunners - and I would like this to be passed on to every Gunner. The Gunners have risen to great heights in the war. They have been well commanded and well handled. In my experience the artillery has never been so efficient as it is today; it is at the top of its form. For all this I offer you my warmest congratulations.
    The contribution of the artillery to final victory in the GERMAN war was immense. This will always be so; the harder the fighting and the longer the war, the more the Infantry, and in fact all the arms, lean on the Gunners. The proper use of artillery is a great battle - winning factor. I think that all the other arms have done very well too, but the artillery has been terrific and I want to give due weight to its contribution to the victory in the campaign."

CONTENTS

Part 1

1943

     9 Army Group Royal Artillery was formed on the 1st of May 1943. The Headquarters was formed by a straight conversion from HQ RA 79th Armoured Division, 79th Armoured Division having recently been given a specific task which did not require Divisional Artillery. At the time of the formation of the AGRA there was no Commander Royal Artillery, 79th Armoured Division as he (Major General C. B. WAINWRIGHT) had just been given command of a Division.
    On the day of formation HQ 9 AGRA continued to command the following Regiments:-

150th Field Regiment RA
193rd Field Regiment RA
55th Anti Tank Regiment RA

i.e. the Regiment which still remained of the late 79th Armoured Division Artillery. These Regiments soon left however :-

150th Field Regiment RA to 4 AGRA
193rd Field Regiment RA to 38th Division, and
55th Anti Tank Regiment RA to 49th Division.

1st May DONCASTER

    At the time of its formation HQ 9 AGRA was located at BRODSWORTH HALL near DONCASTER in YORKSHIRE and was near to the Headquarters of the East Riding and Lincolnshire District. Brigadier F.C.F. CLEEVE DSO, MC was the Commander District Royal Artillery and had at that time under his command certain Medium Regiment RA which were awaiting distribution to various AGsRA which had recently been formed. Amongst these Regiments were the 9th and 11th Medium Regiment RA which had been converted from infantry in the 1st of January 1943 :-

9th Medium Regiment RA from the 8th Battalion The Royal West Kents
11th Medium Regiment RA from the 9th Battalion The Essex Regiment

    Both of these Regiments were placed under the command of 9 AGRA and Brigadier F.C.F. CLEEVE DSO, MC was appointed the first Commander Army Group Royal Artillery.

30th May REDESDALE

    During the last week of May 1943 and the first week of June 1943, 9th and 11th Medium Regiment RA both went to Practice Camp at REDESDALE, and, practising at the same time was the 10th Medium Regiment RA (which had been formed on the 1st of January 1943 from the 16th Battalion The Royal Fusiliers). It was learned at the Practice Camp that the Regiment was also due to come under command of 9 AGRA very shortly.

    On the 7th of June 1943 Brigadier F.C.F. CLEEVE DSO, MC took command of 3 AGRA and Brigadier W.W. CROSLAND TD came to command 9 AGRA from being Commander Royal Artillery, 76th Infantry Division.

    At this time there was considerable activity in the formation of the 21st Army Group and the Second Army and all were hoping that they would find themselves in the Order of Battle of this formation. Unfortunately, it was soon learned that the AGRA was to be the Home Forces AGRA due to the fact that the Regiment under command had only recently been formed from infantry. However, all were determined that this AGRA should reach the standard of efficiency to enable it to be included in the 21st Army Group. AGsRA then were comparatively new formations and 9 AGRA found itself slightly handicapped in not being allotted to any Corps. It was sent for affiliation to, but not placed under command of, 2 Corps.

23rd July NORTHAMPTON

    On the 23rd of July 1943 the formation concentrated in the NORTHAMPTON area. Previous to this the distances between the Regiments had been phenomenal in one case over 200 miles. At the time of this concentration two further Regiments came under command :-

16th Medium Regiment RA which had been formed out of Coast Defence Gunners.

1st Heavy Regiment RA which had been resuscitated out of Coast Defence gunners.

      The Order of Battle, then, of the formation was :-

9th Medium Regiment RA

10th Medium Regiment RA

11th Medium Regiment RA

16th Medium Regiment RA

1st Heavy Regiment RA

    It was now felt that 9 AGRA was a real formation and immediately an intensive period of troop, battery, regimental and formation training was planned. The AGRA remained in the NORTHAMPTON area until the 8th of October, during which time each Regiment was given a comprehensive test during a four day exercise. These exercises were known as the "CAULIFLOWER" series. In addition to this series of regimental exercise, the formation took part in exercise PONTOON and LINK, and this intensive period of training concluded with the 9 AGRA Gallop which was known as "SCAMPER". This Gallop took the formation from the NORTHAMPTON area to WESTDOWN and thence, by a series of night marches to SENNYBRIDGE.

22nd Oct NACTON

    At the conclusion of exercise "SCAMPER", the formation did not return to the NORTHAMPTON area but went to a new area near FELIXSTOWE with the Headquarters at BROKEHALL, NACTON. The immediate demand when the formation arrived here was for all hands for beet pulling. Although, a detailed plan was arranged, the formation did not take part as two things happened :-

firstly the great news that 9 AGRA had come under command of the

21st Army Group as the GHQ AGRA.

23rd Nov BRIGHTON

secondly, orders were received to move again.

After reconnoitring an area in LINCOLNSHIRE,

the formation was ordered to move to BRIGHTON

which it did, and arrived on 23rd November.

     As the formation had been engaged since the Summer mainly on Regimental and higher formation training, it was decided to open a new intensive drive on troop training. The training was greatly assisted by being so close to the SOUTH DOWNS and to ALFRISTON Ranges. During December a series of administrative inspections each lasting two days were carried out by the CAGRA and Staff. Orders for mobilization of Regiments were received round about Christmas and at last all felt assured that the AGRA would take its place in expeditionary Force.

1944

    At the end of February a special exercise was set for the formation by 12 Corps and it was obvious that the object of this exercise was to decide the fitness of the AGRA for war. From this exercise the AGRA emerged with flying colours.

27th April RAWDON

    On the 27th of April 1944 the AGRA moved to YORKSHIRE to make room for the formations which had a higher priority for concentration than the AGRA. Headquarters was established at RAWDON. One formation exercise was arranged consisting of shooting on grasslands, WHEELDALE AND FILINGDALE Ranges, but in the middle of this excise immediate orders were received for the formation to move the next day to its concentration area in the NEW FOREST. The formation moved on the 3rd of June and arrived at BURLEY on the 5th of June.

5th June BURLEY

    The period spent in the concentration area was one of completing the last stages of mobilisation and waterproofing of vehicles. It was thought that the formation would sail from either SOUTHAMPTON or PORTSMOUTH, but on the 6th of July orders were received to move on the 7th of July to a marshalling area for the LONDON DOCKS.

Part 2

COMMANDER, STAFF AND REGIMENTAL COMMANDERS

OF 9 ARMY GROUP ROYAL ARTILLERY ON DISEMBARKATION

AT ARROMANCHES ON 12th JULY 1944

Brigadier W. H. CROSLAND TD	Comd
Major A. N. HALLS RA	BMRA
Captain J. B. COOKE RA	GSO III
Captain G. W. H. CHAMPNESS RA	SCRA
Captain H. R. DARBY RA	IORA
Captain W. S. BULFORD REME	EME
Captain P. SHAW R Sigs	Sigs Offr
Captain P. PAYNE RASC	BRASCO

Lt H. C. WESTALL        HQ Tp Comd

Lt H. SENIOR R Sigs         Sig Sec Offr

F/O J. ETHERINGTON RAF      Met Offr

_______________________

Lt Col R. S. WADE RA	Comd 9 Med Regt RA
Lt Col L. C. M. NASH RA	Comd 10 Med Regt RA
Lt Col M. YATES DSO, OBE, RA	Comd 11 Med Regt RA
Lt Col M. St. J. OSWALD MC, RA	Comd 107 Med Regt RA
Lt Col F. A. BIBRA RA	Comd 146 Med Regt RA
Major D. H. GLOVER RASC	Comd 738 Arty Coy RASC

9th July SOUTH WEST INDIA DOCKS

     The formation set sail from a LONDON embarkation centre on the 9th and 10th of July 1944. HQ 9 AGRA set sail from the SOUTH WEST INDIA DOCKS at approx 7.30 pm on the 9th of July anchoring off SOUTHEND at about 9 o'clock the same evening. At 9 o'clock the next night the convoy put to sea and arrived off the coast of FRANCE at about 8 pm on the 11th of July. Disembarkation began at 8 am the next morning and the HQ passed through ARROMANCHES to the reception camp at BUHOT two or three miles inland where they were to stay for twenty four hours, during which period the necessary de-waterproofing tasks were carried out.

13 th July MANVIEUX

     At 6 o'clock the following morning, the 13th of July, the HQ moved to MANVIEUX there to await the arrival of the five Regiments which were due to follow during the next forty eight hours.

17th July PUTOT-EN-BESSIN

     On the 17th of July the formation had received orders to move to PUTOT-EN-BESSIN where it would be under command of 12 Corps. The Regiments under command of 9 AGRA when it was first in action were the 9th and 11th Medium Regiments RA. The 10th Medium Regiment RA had been sent under command of 30 Corps on the 15th July and were in action near AUDRIEU. The 107th Medium Regiment RA was sent to 8 Corps and were now in action at St GERMAIN-LA-BLANCHE-HERBE near CAEN, while the 146th Medium Regiment RA was also in action in the St GERMAIN-LA-BLANCHE-HERBE area and was subsequently sent permanently to 8 Corps under command of 8 AGRA.

     When the formation was in action it at once became engaged in supporting the attacks of the 43rd and 53rd Infantry Divisions which were directed against EVERECY, MALTOT and the HILL known as point 112, the last mentioned being a particularly dominant feature which overlooked a good deal of our own front. In these early days there was sufficient enemy activity to keep the AGRA firing most of the 24 hours in a day.

28th July GIBERVILLE

     On the 28th of July, orders were received to move over to the left flank of the bridge - head under command of the 2nd Canadian Corps. 9 AGRA took over from 8 AGRA in the general area to the SOUTH of CAEN and VAUCELLES, the Headquarters being first established at GIBERVILLIE, but moving the next day to MONDEVILLE.

     9 AGRA had now been rejoined by the 107th Medium Regiment RA and, in addition, had under command the 108th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA. It became immediately fully committed in supporting the untiring attacks of the Canadians on the enemy strong points of TILLY LA COMPAGNE, ROCQUANCOURT, VERRIERS, BOURGEBUS, LE HOGUE and MAY-SUR-ORNE. This later proved to be the initial phase of the break-out from the bridge head, and the GERMAN infantry, together with armour, bitterly contested every inch of the way. 9 AGRA fired Task Tables, Counter Battery Tasks, Counter Mortar Tasks, Harassing Fire and Defensive Fire almost continuously.

8th August MONDEVILLE

     On the 8th of August, operation "TOTALISE" began, TILLY LA COMPAGNE was entered by the 51st (Highland) Infantry Division, as was ROCQUANCOURT a little later on the same day by the Canadian Infantry. At approximately 1.30 on the afternoon of the 8th of August, some of our own aircraft unfortunately mistook their target and jettisoned their bombs in the area of the Headquarters, and near the Regiment gun area. Command of the AGRA was temporarily transferred to the Regimental Headquarters of the 9th Medium Regiment RA and the Command set up his temporary Headquarters there until about 9 pm the same evening when the normal Headquarters was again able to take over, the damage having been repaired and casualties evacuated.

    On the 11th August the forward troops of the 2nd Canadian Corps had battled their way down the CAEN-FALAISE road as far as QUESNEY WOOD where they were held up by a considerable number of guns and infantry concealed in the wood, which also proved to be fortified by concrete dug outs. The AGRA had moved forward to support the attacks, and the Headquarters was now just to the SOUTH of TILLY LA COMPAGNE, with the 11th Medium Regiment RA at CRAMESNIL, and 9th and 107th Medium Regiment RA at CINTHEAUX. During this time the 11th Medium RA had been working in support of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division and their OPs particularly were having a busy time. Captain M.A. SEARLE RA who was with the 28th Armoured Regiment was ambushed with the Squadron Commander and some infantry. It was not until three days later, after three previous attempts to escape from the woods in which he was hiding, that he succeeded in returning to his Regiment.

    The QUESNEY WOOD was causing so much trouble that it became for a moment one of the main targets for our artillery, and a considerable amount of fire was brought to bear upon it. On the 12th August one Prisoner of War taken from the area stated that from his own company alone, seventeen had been killed and thirty eight wounded by our artillery fire. In spite of this, however, so strong was the enemy's determination to hold on to this feature that on the 14th of August patrols of the Polish Armoured Division, which were at that time under command of the 2nd Canadian Corps stated there was still enemy in the woods in some considerable strength.

15th August PONT-DU-FRESNEY

     On the 14th of August, the 10th Medium Regiment RA returned from 30 Corps and on the same day the 107th Medium Regiment RA was placed under command of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division. The next day the Headquarters moved from the area SOUTH of TILLY and opened at PONT-DU-FRESNEY at 12.15 pm.

     10th Medium Regiments RA had been fully occupied during their attachment to 30 Corps. They had supported the attacks of the 15th (Scottish) Infantry Division and the 50th Infantry Division against the enemy positions at EVERECY, ESQUAY, TESSEL and JOUVIGNY. They had also given support to a successful attack by US forces to the SOUTH WEST of CAUMONT.

     During the afternoon of the 14th of August 107th Medium Regiments RA were unfortunate enough to experience a recurrence of the indiscriminate bombing by allied planes. The Regiment, however, behaved extremely well and the men, far from panicking, drove their vehicles into the fields for better dispersion, whilst the bombs were falling, before taking cover. 9th Medium Regiments RA, however, suffered several casualties.

     On the 16th of August news was received of the entry into the outskirts of FALAISE by Canadians. An OP was established which had a good view of the FALAISE-ARGENTAN road and the regiments were fully engaged in firing into the pocket which was being formed by the Second British Army to the right of the Canadians, and the Americans further still to the right and to the SOUTH.

17th August CINGAL

     Headquarters 9 AGRA moved the next day at 12 o'clock to CINGAL, but remained there for a period of only 24 hours; during the course of the evening a fire broke out in a house at HAMEL LE MARIAS which burned so fiercely that it lit up the whole of the Headquarters area. Men were dispatched to the scene of the fire and it was quickly under control before it attracted the attention of stray enemy aircraft. The area was particularly unpleasant, being littered with enemy dead who lain above ground for a number of days.

18th August SASSY

     The 9th, 10th and 11th Medium Regiments RA moved on the 18th of August to new gun areas, and at 1130 a.m. the Headquarters was established at SASSY. By now reports of enemy Prisoners of War being brought in and white flags being seen by our OPs were becoming more frequent and it appeared that a good bag was to be expected from enemy held in the pocket. Certainly a multitude of targets presented themselves to the OPs and the Regiments were happily blazing away at all the opportunities given. At 8.25 on the evening of the 19th the first "no firing" line was received from the Americans who were almost due SOUTH of the position and were firing at the enemy from the opposite direction. The FALAISE pocket continued to close up fast and at 9 o'clock on the 20th news came of the advance of the 53rd Infantry Division, who were moving so fast towards the EAST that they had to fire green verey lights in order that their troops could be distinguished from the dozens of enemy groups. Later in the day the good news arrived that the 4th Canadian Armoured Division had entered TRUN, thereby more nearly closing the only outlet left to the enemy on the WEST. At 7 o'clock a column of 500 GERMAN wounded was seen straggling up the road towards TRUN, a small number of the many casualties suffered by the enemy in this vital action.

    On the 18th of August, the Commanding Officer of the 107th Medium Regiments RA, Lt Col M. St. J. OSWALD MCRA which was still under command of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division, had been ambushed and captured.

     He had been ordered to reconnoitre a forward gun position in area of GRAND MESNIL, and in case this area was not entirely cleared of snipers, was given a troop of tanks for protection. On entering GRAND MESNIL the two leading tanks, the first of which contained the Commanding Officer, were ambushed and set on fire.

     It was not until some five days later that Lt Col OSWALD succeeded in returning to our own lines. He was greatly aided in his escape by the fact that he pretended to be a Lance Bombardier and succeeded in keeping up the pretence through the time spent in enemy hands.

22nd August VIMOUTIERS

     On the 22nd of August, 9th, 10th and 107th Medium Regiments RA, the latter having returned from 4th Canadian Armoured Division, again moved. This time along the main axis of advance of the Corps with their reconnaissance parties only a few hours ahead of them. At 4 pm the Headquarters moved to a new area just to the EAST of VIMOUTIERS. The roads were lined with damaged vehicles and equipment abandoned by the enemy. Their tiger tanks seemed to have suffered no less then the thinner skinned vehicles from the attacks of our rocket firing Typhoons, and in some cases the turret had been blown clear of(sic) the chassis before the tank had burned out.

     At 8.30 on the evening of the 23rd of August, Lt Col M. St. J. OSWALD MC RA Commanding Office of the 107th Medium Regiments RA returned.

25th August St JULIEN DE FAUCON

     On August the 25th the AGRA was ordered to move NORTH to the area of St JULIEN DE FAUCON where it was to be in harbour for a few days until such time as it might become clear as to where it was most needed in action.

27th August St NICHOLAS DU BOSC

     Tactical Headquarters was sent forward on the the 27th to St NICHOLAS DU BOSC and Regimental reconnaissance parties ordered to the same area. However, the Regiments did not go into action in the new position as the enemy had retired far to the EAST; and all moved up to the area of St NICHOLAS DU BOSC on the 31st. 11th Medium Regiments RA was the only absent regiment from AGRA at the time as it was under the command of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division. They were engaged in an all out pursuit of the enemy to the SEINE.

4th Sept YVETOT

     During the afternoon of the 3rd of September a message arrived to say that the AGRA had been placed under direct command of the First Canadian Army in Army Reserve, and the next day at 1 pm the AGRA left St NICHOLAS DU BOSC and moved over the SEINE to a concentration area NORTH of YVETOT, Headquarters 9 AGRA was at LIMESY with 9th Medium Regiments RA, the 10th Medium Regiments RA at MOTTE-VILLE, 11th Medium Regiments RA at YVETOT and the 107th Medium Regiments RA at CROIX MAIRE.

7th Sept LE HAVRE

     On the 6th of September, 107th Medium Regiments RA moved NORTH again to an area near COLUMBERT to the SOUTH EAST of CAP GRIS NEZ, and the 11th Medium Regiments RA moved to an area NORTH of MONTREUIL on the 7th. The rest of the AGRA moved up to take part in the battle for LE HAVRE. The 1st Heavy Regiment RA came under command for this battle which was to be fought by the 1st British Corps composed of 49th and 51st (Highland) Infantry Divisions.

     In this battle 9 AGRA was responsible for Counter Battery tasks, and at 5.15 pm on the 10th of September the first rounds were fired. The attack went forward extremely well from the first, and by midnight the 49th Infantry Division reported they had taken their first objective. At 11.30 on the morning of the 12th September the Garrison Commander of LA HAVRE surrendered. His Garrison Artillery Commander later stated that 75 per cent of the guns at his disposal had been put out of action or prevented from firing by the Counter Battery fire of the British guns.

13th Sept BOULOGNE

     At 11 am on the 13th of September, Tactical Headquarters moved further NORTH to an area of BOULOGNE, there again to come under command of the 2nd Canadian Corps and to be re-joined by the 11th and 107th Medium Regiment RA. The 1st Heavy Regiment RA returned to the 2nd Canadian AGRA and the 2nd Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RCA took their place. Tactical Headquarters arrived at 7.30 the same evening and were followed by the remainder of the Headquarters which had moved up during the dark and reached the new position at 2 am on the morning of the 14th of September. By 10.15 a.m. on the 14th the AGRA was ready to open fire.

     On the 15th of September the fire plan for operation "WELLHIT" was received and it was learnt that the operation, which was to be directed against BOULOGNE, was due to start on the 17th of September.

     At 9.45 in the evening of the next day there was a change over of the batteries under command of the 51st Heavy Regiment RA. The Regiment received two 7.2 inch batteries from the 53rd Heavy Regiment and 1st Heavy Regiment RA and passed its 155 mm batteries to the 2nd Canadian AGRA; for this operation then the 51st Medium Regiment RA had six 7.2 inch batteries. The 2nd Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RCA was also under command of 9 AGRA and one battery was sent to each of three Medium Regiments, tasks and fire orders being passed by Medium Regiment Headquarters direct to the Heavy Anti- Aircraft Battery under command.

    Regiments under command for the battle were therefore :-

9th Medium Regiment RA
10th Medium Regiment RA
11th Medium Regiment RA
107th Medium Regiment RA
51st Medium Regiment RA	(7.2 inch Bty 51st Heavy Regiment RA
	7.2 inch Bty 1st Heavy Regiment RA
	7.2 inch Bty 53rd Heavy Regiment RA)
2nd Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RCA

    On the morning of the 17th of September the battle for BOULOGNE opened. The ground operations were preceded by heavy air attacks and the Regiments fired counter-flak programmes while our own aircraft were over the target. An interesting feature was the use of the heavy guns of DOVER which fired across the channel on to the GERMAN heavy batteries at CAP GRIS NEZ, their fire being directed by an Observation Post situated on the FRENCH side of the Channel. In order to prevent any threat from the garrison of CAP GRIS NEZ a screen by the reconnaissance regiment of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division was provided between CAP GRIS NEZ and BOULOGNE.

    A good deal of trouble was experienced from mines during the opening phases of the operation. Canadian troops soon reached LE TRESORIE and MOUNT LAMBERT, but it was a long time before the enemy in the concrete dug outs in these two positions could be persuaded to come into the open and surrender. An envoy was sent out from the CAP GRIS NEZ batteries to present terms for surrender. These were refused by the Canadian Divisional Commander.

    On the 18th of September a Liaison Officer was called for from AGRA Headquarters to collect plans for operation "UNDERGO" which was to be directed against CALAIS. It was originally thought that operation might be started about 48 hrs after the commencement of operations against BOULOGNE, but it later proved impossible to carry out this intention. By 9.5 am 16 Officers and 901 Other ranks of the enemy had been captured, and by 2 pm a white flag was flying at LE TRESORIE. On the 19th came the news that the total bag of Prisoners of War for the day amounted to 54 Officers and 2,021 Other Ranks. Next day the total figure had risen to 141 Officers and approximately 5,096 Other Ranks. On the 21st just before midnight this had risen again to 173 Officers and 7,000 Other Ranks.

    At 4.45 on the evening of the 2nd of September, pistol guns on the 10th and 11th Medium Regiment RA were sent forward to a new position SOUTH of CALAIS. Operation "UNDERGO" was now scheduled to start at 8.30 am on the 23rd.

23rd Sept CALAIS

    Positions were now 9th Medium Regiment RA at AUDEMBERT, 10th Medium Regiment RA at LEUBRINGHEN, 11th Medium Regiment RA and 107th Medium Regiment RA at MARQUISE. Headquarters 9 AGRA left ALINGTHUN and was established at FURQUES by 12 noon. Operation "UNDERGO" was postponed until 6.30 pm on the 25th of September, the garrison at BOULOGNE having proved rather larger, and the defences more difficult to crack, than had first been anticipated.

    The attack on CALAIS was again preceded by heavy bombing programme. The Observatory to the WEST of the town was soon captured, but a good deal of trouble was experienced from the CAP GRIS NEZ batteries who were now firing in enfilade into the AGRA gun area. At 7.15 on the morning of the 26th, 11th Medium Regiment RA was ordered to turn to face these batteries and engage them in order to cramp their style as much as possible. One battery of the 51st Heavy Regiment RA was also employed on the same job, but at 6 am on the 27th of September, a shell landed in the area of the 10th Medium Regiment RA and one of the Officers was fatally injured. At 9.15 the same evening all six batteries of the 51st Heavy Regiment RA were turned against the CAP GRIS NEZ guns which were now firing approximately 10 rounds per hour, distributed over the gun area. It was decided that the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade should put in an attack at 6.30 on the morning of the 29th with a view to over-running the CAP GRIS NEZ batteries and silencing the guns.

    An hour after the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade attack had started, a white flag was flying from the HARINGZELLES Battery. At 10.45 a message was received from the Commander of the Brigade that he was most impressed with the AGRAs shooting and most grateful for its help.

29th Sept CAP GRIS NEZ

    The Forward Observation Officer from the 11th Medium Regiment RA who accompanied the attack infantry succeeded in capturing the flag flown by the GERMAN Commander of the HARINGZELLES cross channel battery. This was sent to the Divisional Commander who in turn forwarded it to the Mayor of Dover. It is most fitting that the 11th Medium Regiment RA should have been instrumental in the capture of these guns as when they were infantry, their Brigade known as the "DOVER Brigade" came under the shellfire of the HARINGZELLES battery.

    Later in the same day the 2nd Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RCA left 9 AGRA and returned under the orders of 107th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Brigade, their parent formation.

    Meanwhile the CALAIS battle pushed forward and at mid-day on the 30th an officer of the GERMAN Garrison approached the Commander of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division with a view to surrender at 3.30 that afternoon. The reply he received was that the garrison should surrender immediately or else the battle would continue. As these terms were refused, the battle continued but at 7.45 in the evening the garrison surrendered unconditionally.

1st Oct YPRES

    On the 1st of October, 9 AGRA moved to a harbour area near YPRES and stayed there for two days, moving on the 3rd of October to the area of EECLOO not far from the DUTCH BORDER.

3rd Oct EECLOO

    At 12 o'clock on the same day it was learned that the 3rd Super Heavy Regiment RA would come under command as soon as it arrived in the area. 10th Medium Regiment RA was moved round to the EAST and deployed in the area of PHILLIPINE on the 5th October.

    On the 6th of October at 3.30 am the battle to clear up the enemy in the SCHELDT pocket was joined. Regiments under command of 9 AGRA at the time were :-

9th Medium Regiment RA

10th Medium Regiment RA

11th Medium Regiment RA

107th Medium Regiment RA

51st Heavy Regiment RA

59th Heavy Regiment RA

3rd Super Heavy Regiment RA

    A programme was fired in support of the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade who were the first to establish a bridge-head over the LEOPOLD CANAL. The 3rd Super Heavy Regiment RA, who were not engaged in the programme, fired Arty R shoots on FLUSHING, OOSTBURG and SCHOONDIJKE.

    This battle proved to be a difficult and tedious one, particularly for the infantry. The 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade who were the first over, did not succeed in making much headway and were pinned down a few hundred yards from the NORTH bank of the LEOPOLD CANAL and remained there for several days. On the 9th of October the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade began an attack over the SAVOJAARDS PLAAT from the EAST and this operation gained ground and encountered less opposition from the enemy. By 9 a.m. on the 9th the first wave of troops were ashore and the operation was going well.

    On the 10th of October the 15th Medium Regiment RA came under temporary control of 9 AGRA from the 2nd Canadian AGRA. Later in the day it was learnt that the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade had already taken 9 Officers and 458 Other Ranks as Prisoners of War.

21th Oct BENTILLE

     The operation pushed steadily forward for the next week and on the 21st, Tactical Headquarters 9 AGRA moved on BENTILLE. The 9th, 107th Medium Regiment RA and the 51st Heavy Regiment RA moved to new positions to give greater search into enemy territory. The 3rd Super Heavy Regiment RA was left behind under operational control of the 2nd Canadian AGRA.

23rd Oct LAMSWAARDE

    On the 23rd of October 9 AGRA left BENTILLE and moved to LAMSWAARDE from which position it was possible to shoot across the SCHELDT on to SOUTH BEVELAND where a new operation was to take place by the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division and the 52nd (Lowland) Infantry Division.

    This Move was carried out at extremely short notice and the whole AGRA was committed to covering of a long distance over roads which were by no means first class. The fact that the AGRA arrived complete in the space of a few hours constituted a creditable performance.

    The SCHELDT pocket had not at this time been finally cleared, but only a relatively small number of enemy remained on the NORTH WEST side of the pocket who were mopped up whilst the new operation was in progress.

    It had been rightly anticipated by CAGRA that the AGRA would be in the vicinity of the LEOPOLD CANAL for two or three weeks and with this in view a Rest Centre was established in EECLOO. The centre was in a factory building where good sleeping accommodation was available, a well lighted dining room, and a canteen with reading and writing rooms. 12 men per Regiment were allowed to stay at this Centre for a period of 48 hours each to take a well earned rest and to seize the opportunity of cleaning their clothes and equipment. An added attraction was the opening of the train service to GHENT and a number of the men availed themselves of this opportunity of buying gifts to send home.

    As the Allied advance continued EASTWARD into GERMANY and NORTH through HOLLAND, it became increasingly clear that the use of the port of ANTWERP for the unloading of supplies was essential. The port could not be put into operation until SOUTH EBVELAND(sic) and WALCHEREN had been cleared of the enemy. The Royal Air Force had already succeeded in breaking the dykes and flooding about two thirds of WALCHEREN, but the Garrison of FLUSHING still remained a direct threat, their coastal guns guarding the approaches to the SCHELDT.

     The 2nd Canadian Infantry Division was already beginning to probe along the Isthmus of SOUTH BEVELAND and on the 24th of October, the 9th Medium Regiment RA were put in support of the Division to assist them in their advance. 9 AGRA had under command for this operation :-

79th Field Regt RA

9th Medium Regiment RA

10th Medium Regiment RA

11th Medium Regiment RA

107th Medium Regiment RA

51st Heavy Regiment RA

59th Heavy Regiment RA

118th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA

121st Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA

174th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA

    With the exception of the 9th Medium Regiment RA all were to support the Brigade of the 52nd (Lowland) Infantry Division who were doing a sea-borne attack across the SCHELDT. With this formidable group and with a number of AGRA representatives with the Infantry, a great weight of fire was brought down in support of the Division.

    On the 25th of October, the 11th Medium Regiment RA relieved the 9th Medium Regiment RA in support of the Canadians, and on the 26th at 4.30 in the morning, 52nd (Lowland) Infantry Division's operation began with the assault of the 156th Infantry Brigade. The attack met with initial success, but at 8.45 in the evening the Forward Observation Officer of the 9th Medium Regiment RA reported that a counter attack had brought the enemy so close that even the use of wireless was most inadvisable, as his voice could be heard by the enemy. However, by 12.30 am on the 27th he reported that the situation was much better. Later the same day the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division crossed the main SOUTH BEVELAND CANAL.

    On the 28th of October at 3 pm the AGRA representative with the 156th Infantry Brigade reported that the Brigade Headquarters was receiving a good deal of attention form a number of enemy 88 mm guns. Later in the afternoon these were silenced with the assistance of the Counter Battery Officer who was attached to the Headquarters.

    On the 29th of October at 9.30 am came warning of a move and at the same time news arrived that the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division and the 156th Infantry Brigade had linked up. The 79th Field Regiment RA, 9th 10th, 11th and 107th Medium Regiment RA were by now out of range and only the 155mm guns of the 51st and 59th Heavy Regiments RA were able to give effective support. This they continued to do until 5.30 pm on the 30th.

    On the 31st of October the AGRA moved to the area of IJZENDIJKE, there being under command :-

61st Field Regiment RA

110th Field Regiment RA

9th Medium Regiment RA

10th Medium Regiment RA

11th Medium Regiment RA

107th Medium Regiment RA

51st Heavy Regiment RA

59th Heavy Regiment RA

31th Oct IJZENDIJKE

    The 79th Field Regiment RA had moved round to the SOUTH BEVELAND Isthmus by way of ANTWERP, and were now in support of the 52nd (Lowland) Infantry Division.

    It was interesting to note the damage done by artillery fire in the town of IJZENDIJKE and the surrounding villages. A good deal of this must be attributable to 9 AGRA, since this area had received a lot of attention when the AGRA was deployed on the other side of the LEOPOLD CANAL. There was scarcely a building which had not been damaged and the road too had suffered their share.

    At 4.45 am on the 1st of November the first rounds of the programme in support of operation "INFATUATE" were fired. The 155th Infantry Brigade of the 52nd (Lowland) Infantry Division landed at FLUSHING and at 9.45 the 4th Special Service Brigade landed at WESTKAPELLE.

2nd Nov BRESKENS

     November the 2nd saw the AGRA firing concentrations on call, harassing fire and counter battery tasks throughout the day. On the 4th of November the 52nd Heavy Regiment RA came under operational command of 9 AGRA and the same day the Tactical Headquarters was sent forward to BRESKENS. By 4 pm on the 6th it was learned that our forward troops had entered MIDDLEBURG, and at 6 pm all Regiments with the exception of the 10th Medium Regiment RA and the 155 mm Guns of the 52nd and 59th Heavy Regiment RA were out of range.

    The next day the whole AGRA moved to the area of BUDEL (a distance of just over 100 miles), and came under command of the 12th British Corps on arrival. The 61st and 110th Field Regiment RA and the 52nd Heavy Regiment RA ceased to be under command.

11th Nov WEERT

    On the 8th November a reconnaissance was made of new gun areas and on the 10th, Advance Headquarters and the 11th Medium Regiment RA moved up to their battle positions. At 9.30 a.m. on the 11th the remainder of the Headquarters moved to WEERT and established themselves in the railway station. The regiments were now deployed around the town with the 10th Medium Regiment RA a little further forward at SWARTBROEK.

    At 4 O'clock on the evening of the 14th operation "MALLARD" started and went well from the first. Regiments under command for this operation were :-

9th Medium Regiment RA

10th Medium Regiment RA

11th Medium Regiment RA

107th Medium Regiment RA

107th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA

17th Nov SCHOORSTRAAT

    The 51st and 53rd Infantry Division were driving enemy back towards the MAAS and steady progress was maintained through the next two days, the AGRA firing concentrations on call and counter battery tasks as required. At 3 pm on the 17th of November, the Headquarters moved to the area of SCHOORSTRAAT and although one night had to be spent in the open, more suitable accommodation was found the next day. By now the only enemy remaining this side of the MAAS was a small pocket at ROERMOND and most of the firing consisted of bombards.

    On the 20th November at seven minutes past 10 in the morning the CAGRA fired all guns of the AGRA on to its first target on GERMAN soil.

    The next few days tell of steady progress of our infantry and at 10.30 am on the 26th of November the Headquarters moved to KONINGSLUST CLOISTER with the gun area WEST and SOUTH of MAASBREE, with a view to supporting the attack to clear up the small pocket of enemy on this side of the River opposite VENLO. The 107th Medium Regiment RA found themselves in the unfortunate position of having their gun area surrounded by a mine field, and at 6.55 in the evening their position was bombed and shelled. The 11th Medium Regiment RA also suffered in this raid, two of their men becoming casualties.

30th Nov BILZEN

    On the 28th of November it was learned that the AGRA was to be relieved by the 3rd AGRA and were soon to move to 30 Corps area for a new operation. At 10 am on the 30th the Headquarters followed by Regiments moved to a concentration area at BILZEN and remained there for the next week.

8th Dec MUNSTERGELEEN

    On the 8th of December the Headquarters moved to MUNSTERGELEEN. The 107th Medium Regiment RA being in GELEEN with the 165th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA next door to them, having the 421st Heavy Anti-Aircraft Battery of 108th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA under command. The 3rd Super Heavy Regiment RA again came under command for this operation, whilst the 9th and 11th Medium Regiment RA were sent to be under operational control of the 5th AGRA since the gun positions they had been allotted made this arrangement more satisfactory.

    All the Regiments were to be engaged in supporting the Corps operation "SHEARS". The 3rd Super Heavy Regiment RA were given the particular job of breaking up re-inforced concrete shelter which formed part of the SIEGFRIED LINE. This operation was postponement, it was learned the operation was not going to take place. However, the AGRA had the satisfaction of taking part in a counter battery programme starting at 10 am on the 14th of December which catered for a "good dusting" of all the known batteries on the Corps front.

Part 3

    On the 17th of December 1944 news arrived of the large scale GERMAN counter offensive which had started against the US Armies in the ARDENNES area. This offensive proved to be on a larger scale than was first expected and during the time in which our own counter measures were being taken 9 AGRA had a comparatively defensive role in the area of SITTARD and GANGELT, to the NORTH of AACHEN.

    There were numerous reports of enemy paratroops and glider landings and it was generally expected that some kind of attack, be it on a small or large scale, would be launched by the enemy in this sector. Howerver, most of the reports of enemy landings received at Headquarters 9 AGRA proved, upon close investigation to be false, and generally lead to the conviction that they were started by civilians who were over anxious on account of the prevailing situation.

21th Dec RUMPEN

    On the 21st of December 1944 Headquarters 9 AGRA moved to RUMPEN to be in a more central position in relation to the gun areas. The Counter Battery Officer of 12 Corps was sent to 9 AGRA and the Commander 9 AGRA became responsible for all counter battery measures. An officer of the AGRA was sent to the Fire Direction Centre of XIII US Corps and they in turn sent a LO to live at Headquarters 9 AGRA. With the aid of these officers close liaison was made between the American artillery and ourselves and we were often able to build up their fire when targets presented themselves on the US sector and vice versa.

    On the 22nd of December the AGRA was strengthened by the arrival of 67th Medium Regiment RA; Regiments under command now being :-

9th Medium Regiment RA

11th Medium Regiment RA

67th Medium Regiment RA

107th Medium Regiment RA

165th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA

51st Heavy Regiment RA

3rd Super Heavy Regiment RA

    9th Medium Regiment RA was deployed near GROTENRATH and 11th Medium Regiment RA was also in GERMANY, being about 2 miles NE of BRUNSSUM. 107th Medium Regiment RA on the other hand was well over to the left flank and deployed in the area of SITTARD.

    67th Medium Regiment RA, 165th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA and 51st Heavy Regiment RA had a central position between the Medium Regiments, while the 3rd Super Heavy Regiment RA had its Headquarters at AMSTENRADE.

    From these positions all fire landed in GERMANY.

    The AGRA settled down to its defensive role and engaged such targets as presented themselves, assisting the breaking up of numerous small enemy counter attacks which developed along the front. By night harassing fire tasks were fired on to roads, villages and bridges which might be used by the enemy in his efforts to build up a large attacking force.

    Shortly before Christmas it was decided to form a 9 AGRA Concert Party to entertain the Regiments over the Christmas period. Fortunately there was a very good theatre near BRUNSSUM in which the party could rehearse and open its show. At this theatre the show ran for a week giving two performances a day and entertaining all the Regiments of the AGRA. A large number of 52 Lowland and 7 Armoured Division were also entertained. The party later played at "The Desert Rats" theatre in GELEEN but an offer from the Welfare Officer 12 Corps for the use of the party had to be refused for operational reasons.

    This entertainment gave a great deal of pleasure to a great many units.

1945

    On the 2nd of January 1945 Field Marshal Sir B. L. MONTGOMERY came to the area to present medal ribbons to the officers and men of 52 Lowland Infantry Division and 9 AGRA. The following officers and men received ribbons :-

Capt P. ROWLAND-JONES MC RA	9 Med Regt RA
Capt P. J. HOWARD MC RA	9 Med Regt RA
Capt J. B. DOUGLAS MC RA	11 Med Regt RA
Capt B. F. MARSH MC RA	107 Med Regt RA
Capt E. B. DOBSON MC RA	107 Med Regt RA
No 6025858 Gnr F. S. DAWSON MM	11Med Regt RA
No 6026495 Gnr W. MARKHAM MM	11 Med Regt RA
No 554918 Gnr W. FARMER MM	107 Med Regt RA
No 1091370 Gnr A. E. SHEPHERD MM	107 Med Regt RA

    It soon became apparent that it had been decided that 12 Corps was to go over to the offensive in order to clear the enemy from between the MAAS and the ROER, and orders were received for operation "BLACKCOCK" which was due to commence on 15th January. However, owning to a certain amount of fog on that day the operation was postponed for 24 hours and began at 8 a.m. on 16th January, Although Headquarters 9 AGRA and Counter Battery Officer did not move, two regiments were re-deployed for operation :-

9th Medium Regiment RA moved to SCHINVELD

107th Medium Regiment RA moved to EINIGHAUSEN

    This operation was carried out by three Divisions, 52 Lowland and 43 Wessex Infantry Divisions and 7th Armoured Division, and the various phases were timed so that the enemy should be hit first on one side of his line and then on the other in quick succession. 9 AGRA was called upon to support all three Divisions and a number of Task Tables and Counter Battery Programmes were fired in the days subsequent to the commencement of operation. In addition artillery reconnaissance was flown, and targets at a great depth in the enemy lines were engaged by this means. The guns were never silent at night, the enemy being harassed in every possible way.

    The operation progressed rather slowly owing to the appalling weather conditions, a thaw having set in within 24 hours after the start of the operation. However, HEINSBERG, the largest town in the sector, was reported captured and clear of the enemy by 1015 a.m. on the 22nd of January.

    Operation "BLACKCOCK" was virtually complete by the 26th of January but there remained small portions of enemy territory to be cleared on the extreme right flank of 12 Corps and on the left flank of XIII US Corps. This operation was carried out by an American Division and went very swiftly indeed. On the first day 26th January, all the days objectives had been captured by 08.30 a.m. and it soon became apparent that the enemy had left no rearguards in this small strip of country. By the end of the month there were no enemy left on the WEST bank of the ROER.

    Almost as soon as 12 Corps operation had been completed, 9 AGRA was warned that it would be required to assist 30 Corps in a new operation called "VERITABLE" which was designed to clear the enemy from between the MAAS and the RHINE.

3rd Feb MOLL

4th Feb HAPS

    On the 3rd of February, all Regiments moved to MOLL to harbour for the night and the next day moved again to the HAPS area arriving late on the night of the 4th.

    Headquarters 9 AGRA moved from RUMPEN to HAPS on the 3rd of February and the Headquarters opened there the same day.

    Thereafter following a short period of preparation for this big attack which was to take place on a five Divisional front. The operation was controlled by the First Canadian Army which had under command the 2nd Canadian Corps and the 30th British Corps. Regiments under command 9 AGRA at this time were :-

9th Medium Regiment RA

11th Medium Regiment RA

107th Medium Regiment RA

53rd Heavy Regiment RA

165th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA

3rd Super Heavy Regiment RA

303/99th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Battery RA

    146th Medium Regiment RA also came under operational command later. In addition the Commander 9 AGRA again had under command the Counter Battery Officer 12 Corps.

    At 4.30 am on the 8th of February the first rounds of the opening programme for operation "VERITABLE" were fired. This proved to be a very large programme and a considerable amount of ammunition was expended. At least one of the Medium Regiments of the AGRA fired over 300 rounds per gun on the first day.

    The operation started well but slowed down after the first few days due again to poor going and to the enemy's quick reaction to an attack on what he knew to be a vital sector. There were soon as many Divisions of the enemy in active opposition as there were under command of the First Canadian Army, and the picture began to resemble the CAEN battle and the FALAISE pocket, with the bulk of the GERMAN infantry, armour and guns drawn against First Canadian Army.

    The enemy artillery was, in itself, an important factor in the slowing down of the attack and the 12th Corps Counter Battery Officer was kept very busy in meeting all the demands for neutralizing fire. Air Observation Post and artillery reconnaissance also assisted in picking a number of targets for the fire of the AGRA.

    The enemy had never been short of artillery weapons and he had made full use of the misty days, when our own aircraft had been unable to harass his lines of communication, in getting up a more plentiful supply of ammunition.

19th Feb GENNEP

    On the 17th of February our own troops had progressed far enough to allow the 11th Medium Regiment RA to cross over the River MAAS and deploy in the area just SOUTH of GENNEP. They were followed on the 18th by the 165th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA and the 107th Medium Regiment RA and by the 19th, 9th Medium Regiment RA and 53rd Heavy Regiment RA were also in the new position. Tactical Headquarters 9 AGRA was established in GENNEP itself on the 18th and whole of the Headquarters moved over to this area on the morning of the 19th.

    The AGRA was now deployed on the right flank of the Corps being primarily concerned with Counter Battery work and firing programmes and tasks on call for the 52nd Infantry Division who had the 11th Medium Regiment RA in support. Also various tasks for the 51st Infantry Division and 53rd Infantry Division were fired. The right flank did not move forward as fast as the remainder of the front but by the 26th of February the road between HASSUM and GOCH had been completely cleared of the enemy and the Regiments were able to move forward in turn to deploy in that area. In addition to the normall artillery reconnaissance and Air Observation Post spotting of hostile batteries, the Headquarters now supplied daily fighter bomber demands for neutralization of some three or four hostile batteries which were known to be particularly active.

2nd March HASSUM

    By the 2nd of March, all the Regiments were deployed in a new area along the road between HASSUM and GOCH and Headquarters 9 AGRA moved to a small hamlet NORTH of HASSUM.

    On this day came the news of the link up between the XIII US Corps and First Canadian Army troop on the road between GELDERN and KEVELAER. The American had succeeded in breaking out across the ROER and ERFT some days previously and had rapidly swept up the EAST bank of the MAAS capturing ROERMOND and VENLO in quick succession in their advance.

    The whole front now rapidly folded up but unfortunately the enemy succeeded in organising a stable bridge head in the area of XANTEN and WESEL. Only the Super Heavy guns of the AGRA could now fire, as all the other Regiments were out of range. These Regiments took the opportunity of a few days maintenance while the 8 inch guns were given harassing fire targets in the area of XANTEN ferry and the principal roads in WESEL.

    On the afternoon of Sunday the 4th of March, the Prime Minister visited the 3rd Super Heavy Regiment RA attended by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff Field Marshal Sir Alan F BROOKE, Field Marshal B. L. MONTGOMERY, General CRERAR, Commander of the 51st Highland Infantry Division. The party was met by Brigadier W. H. CROSLAND Commander 9 AGRA. The Commander introduced Lt Col J. B. HYDE-SMITH and 15 Super Heavy Battery Commander Major SANSOM to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister inspected the 240 mm guns of the Battery and chalked his message "TO HITLER PERSONAL" on one of the Super Heavy shells. He then tentatively enquired whether he might shoot it; the shell was loaded then fired by the Prime Minister against the XANTEN ferry.

    At 6 p.m. on the 8th of March 9 AGRA passed to under command of 2nd Canadian Corps who were finally to clear the remainder of the enemy from the WEST of the RHINE.

Part 4

    On the evening of the 9th of March at about 10.30, 53rd Heavy Regiment RA were warned that they would no longer be under command of 9 AGRA.

    On the next day, 2nd Canadian Corps stated that as far as they were concerned the battle on the WEST side of the River RHINE was over and at 11.30 pm the same day the AGRA was informed that it would shortly move to an area near HELMOND to come under command of Second Army Troops on arrival. 3rd Super Heavy Regiment were placed under direct command of the 2nd Canadian Corps. These movement orders were confirmed the next day, but 165th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA and the Air Observation Post Flight were not to be included. At 12.45 it was officially confirmed that no enemy remained on the WEST side of the River RHINE.

13th March MOLL

    The AGRA moved on the 13th; Headquarters to MOLL, 9th and 11th Medium Regiments RA to MEERHOUT and 107th Medium Regiment RA to BERINGEN. During this short stay in the HELMOND area regiments were to take the opportunity to calibrate on LOMMEL Ranges to prepare for the next big battle. On account of the distance involved, 3rd Super Heavy Regiment RA did not move, but instead carried out calibration from their old battle positions, shooting across the RHINE.

    The next week was spent in full and careful preparation for operation "PLUNDER" which was shortly due to take place. For this operation 9 AGRA was under command of 12th Corps Briefly the plan was that 1st Commando Brigade was to cross the RHINE just WEST of WESEL at about 10.30 on the evening of the 23rd of March and capture the town. A few hours later 15th (Scottish) Infantry Division with two Brigade were to cross opposite XANTEN and secure a bridgehead there.

    To the NORTH of 12th Corps, 30th Corps was responsible for the crossing of the RHINE and capture of REES while to the SOUTH 9 US Army was to cross above WESEL. There was also to be an operation "VARSITY" by airborne troops to be carried out by 18 US Airborne Corps with 17 US Airborne Division on the RIGHT and 6 British Airborne Division on the LEFT. These two Divisions were to drop immediately to the rear of the enemy opposing 12th Corps.

    On the 16th, Brigadier C. H. M. BRUNKER DSO took over command of 9 AGRA from Brigadier W. H. CROSLAND CBE TD who was returning to ENGLAND prior to release from the service. Deep regret was felt by all at the departure of the Commander who had trained and led the AGRA through hard but successful days.

21th March SONSBECK

    On the 21st of March, Headquarters 9 AGRA moved up from MOLL to its Battle Headquarters; these were just NE of SONSBECK and not far from XANTEN. On the same day the regiments moved up to their wagon line area near GELDERN. On the evening of the next day regiments moved into their gun area on the outskirts of XANTEN.

    During this move a smoke screen was put down along the whole of the WEST bank of the RHINE as far as possible to cover any movement. Although this smoke screen had a disagreable(sic) effect on the men who were working to get the guns into the site, a high standard of camourflage(sic) was maintained.

     Regiments under command for this battle were :-

9th Medium Regiment RA

11th Medium Regiment RA

107th Medium Regiment RA

90th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA

3rd Super Heavy Regiment RA

    The AGRA tasks for the operation involved a large counter battery programme followed by programmes in support of the Commandoes and Divisions, and thereafter targets as required on call. There was also a programme immediately prior to the airborne operation. At 6 o'clock on the evening of the 23rd March, the opening rounds of the counter battery programme were fired and shortly after 10 o'clock reported were received that the first troops were safely across the RHINE. At 1.30 am on the 24th the Commanos(sic) were reported to be fighting in the streets of WESEL.

    At 10 o'clock the same morning the leading flights of the airborne corps passed overhead and although there was a certain amount of enemy Anti-Aircraft fire the operation proved to be a pronounced success. At 2.20 pm on the same afternoon 6 British airborne Division reported that all their objectives had been taken and by the evening the airborne troops had linked up with 15th (Scottish) Infantry Division; some 10,000 Prisoners of War had already been taken, on the army front.

    On the 25th, 107th Medium Regiment RA was ordered to move by batteries into a new position from which they could more easily support the 52nd (Lowland) Infantry Division, and 11th Medium Regiment RA also moved in support of 15th (Scottish) Infantry Division. On the 26th, 9th Medium Regiment RA followed suit and moved up to the edge of the RHINE and slightly to the EAST thereby obtaining greater search into enemy country.

    On the 27th 11th and 107th Medium Regiment RA were both placed in support of 15th (Scottish) Infantry Division and warned that they might be required to move to the other side of the RHINE at short notice. However, this was not actually necessary as the advance continued very speedily. At 1230 on the morning of the 28th, orders were received that there would be no more fire to the west or south of BOCHOLT, a small town some considerable distance to the EAST of the RHINE.

    On the 29th, wireless communications were closed down; whilst on the 30th all regiments were ordered out of action as there were no longer any targets within range.

    On the 1st of April, 107th Medium Regiment RA were ordered to move from under 9 AGRA to under command 1st Canadian. AGRA and the remainder of the regiments started to busy themselves with battlefield clearance since they were not required for further operations.

    The AGRA was in fact "grounded" and the RASC Platoons and a similar platoon made up from personnel and vehicles from each regiment were sent under command of 12th Corps to assist the forward troops in following up the enemy with speed.

14th April BOCHOLT

    The RHINE crossing proved to be the last battle which 9 AGRA was to fight in the GERMAN campaign. It was inevitable something of an anti-climax when orders were received to move to the BOCHOLT area and take over garrison duties in the landkreis of AHAUS, BORKEN and COESFELD. However, when on the 8th of May 1945 Victory in EUROPE was announced, 9 AGRA felt that it had in some measure contributed to the successful execution of a historic campaign.

COMMANDER, STAFF AND REGIMENTAL COMMANDERS

OF 9 ARMY GROUP ROYAL ARTILLERY ON VE DAY

8th OF MAY 1945

Brigadier C. H. M. BRUNKER DSO	Commander
Major A. H. V. GROOM MC RA	BMRA
Captain J. B. COOKE RA	GSO III
Captain G. W. H. CHAMPNESS RA	SCRA
Captain H. R. DARBY RA	IORA
Captain W. S. BULFORD REME	EME
Captain F. P. SHAW R Sigs	Sigs Offr
Captain P. J. C. PAYNE RASC	BRASCO

Lt A. R. GLASS R Sigs Sig Sec Offr

Lt H. C. WESTALL RA HQ Tp Comd

F/O J. N. CLARK RAF Met Offr

____________________

Lt Col R. S. WADE OBE RA	Comd 9 Med Regt RA
Lt Col A. E. CHESSELLS RA	Comd 11 Med Regt RA
Lt Col T. H. HARDY RA	Comd 107 Med Regt RA
Lt Col J. B. HYDE-SMITH RA	Comd 3 Super Hy Regt RA
Major D. H. GLOVER RASC	Comd 738 Coy RASC (Arty)

Part 5

3rd SUPER HEAVY REGIMENT RA

22nd Sept GOSPORT

    On the 22nd of September 1944, Regimental Headquarters 3rd Super Heavy Regiment RA and 15th Super Heavy Battery RA moved down to GOSPORT to load into LSTs. The guns and M6 tractors were carried in three LSTs and the convoy sailed at 2 pm, arriving off NEWHAVEN at 8 o'clock the same evening. At 11.30 pm they set sail for DIEPPE.

23rd Sept DIEPPE

    Unloading commenced at 3.15 on the afternoon of the 23rd and all the vehicles and guns were unloaded by 4.30. These were the first LSTs into DIEPPE harbour and the vehicles and guns were the first to use the new unloading ramp in the harbour.

    The same day the 4th Super Heavy Battery RA started to load at GOSPORT being due to follow up the first party 24 hours later.

24th Sept NEUFCHATEL

    On the 24th of September, the Regimental Headquarters and 15th Super Heavy Battery RA moved to NEUFCHATEL and arrived there at 5 pm.

25th Sept ABBEVILLE

    They moved again on the 25th to ABBEVILLE. On the 26th one half of the 4th Super Heavy Battery RA, which had unloaded at DIEPPE the day before, joined up with the remainder of the Regiment. A few vehicles of the Regiment Headquarters which had travelled with the 4th Super Heavy Battery RA also, arrived at the same time.

29th Sept St OMER

    On the 29th of September the Regiment, or that part which had arrived up to date, moved again to St OMER, a distance of 60 miles. Both fast and slow columns left at 8 am, the fast arrived at 1230 and the slow at 2 pm. The Regimental Headquarters was established at STAPLE.

30th Sept MACHELEN

    The next day the Regiment again moved to the area of DEYNZE. Although the guns had to be winched across a Class 40 bridge at COURTAI, good time was made and the Regimental Headquarters and both Batteries reach their destination by 4 o'clock in the afternoon. The Regimental Headquarters was established at MACHELEN 4th Super Heavy Battery RA at DEYNZE and 15th Super Heavy Battery RA at OLSENE.

2nd Oct EECLOO

    On the 2nd of October the Regiment was placed under command of the 2nd Canadian Corps, and on reporting to the Corps Headquarters the Commanding Officer learned that the Regiment was to support the attack of the Canadian Infantry on the LEOPOLD CANAL from gun areas near EECLOO. These areas were unsuitable but did not prove impossible and on the 4th October, 4th and 15th Super Heavy Battery RA sent cranes forward to the new positions. The Regiment was to be under command of 9 AGRA and the Commanding Officer visited HQ 9 AGRA for orders.

    The task of the Regiment in this position was Arty R shoots directed against FLUSHING, OOSTBURG and SCHOONDIJKE. A tentacle reported to the Regimental Headquarters during the afternoon of the 15th of October. 4th Super Heavy Battery RA was deplored NORTH EAST of LEMBEKE and the 15th Super Heavy Battery RA WEST of CAPRYKE, Regimental Headquarters at DOORN.

    On the 11th of October the remaining half of the 4th Super Heavy Battery RA reported to the Regiment together with 1759 Artillery Platoon RASC. The Regiment was now complete except for the 5th Super Heavy Battery RA of which no sign had been seen. However on the 14th news was received that the 5th Super Heavy Battery RA was at SLEYDING and on the 15th it moved into a position SOUTH of DONCK.

    On the 17th, the 5th Super Heavy Battery RA engaged Hostile Batteries in the KNOCKLE area by Arty R and the plane reported that 14 rounds had fallen within an area of 50 yards square.

12th Oct EECLOO

    On the 18th the Regimental Headquarters moved to EECLOO, this being a more suitable area from the point of view of maintaining close communication with HQ 9 AGRA. On the same day the first Air Observation Post shoot of the Regiment was carried out against Hostile Batteries in FLUSHING. Communications worked very satisfactorily and the results were good.

    The first ground observation shoots were carried out on the 19th of October. The Observation Post was established at LISSEWEGHE Church. The target was a suspect Headquarters and the front of the house was blown in by a round which landed in the garden.

29th Oct SCHOONDIJKE

    On the 23rd the Regiment came under command of the 2nd Canadian AGRA and new areas were reconnoitred SOUTH WEST of HOOFDPLAAT. On the 24th the No. 2 Gun of the 15th Super Heavy Battery RA moved near to BENTILLE and the No. 1 gun of 4th Super Heavy Battery RA to the EAST of BENTILLE. 4th Super Heavy Battery RA established an Observation Post on the EAST side of BRESKENS. On the 29th of October the whole Regiment moved to new positions, Regimental Headquarters to SCHOONDIJKE, 4th Super Heavy Battery RA to ROBNHOEK and 5th and 15th Super Heavy Batteries RA to KRUISDIJK.

1st Nov WALCHEREN

    By the 1st of November, the Regiment was ready to support the attack on WALCHEREN ISLAND. From their battle positions batteries could not shoot down to FLUSHING as the minimum ranges for the 8 inch and 240 mm equipments are 10,800 and 8,500 yards respectively. Forward wagon lines were therefore established near SCHOONDIJKE so that the M6 Tractor would be readily available to move the Batteries if required. However as the battle went well from the first, this was not necessary.

    The 2nd of November saw the largest ammunition expenditure for the battle. The 15th Super Heavy Battery RA fired 122 rounds, 15th Super Heavy Battery RA 66 rounds and the 4th Super Heavy Battery RA 22 rounds, a total of 210 rounds for the Regiment.

    On the 3rd of November, as the battle for WALCHEREN was progressing very well, the forward wagon lines were moved back from the gun areas. The zero lines were moved 9 degrees over to the right so as to bring fire to the centre and EAST of the Island. The Regiment was again engaged in shooting against Hostile Batteries.

7th Nov WINGHE

    On the 5th of November, 5th and 15th Super Heavy Batteries RA were brought out of action and moved to the wagon lines in the EECLOO and WAERSCHOOT areas respectively. On the 7th of November, the rest of the Regiment moved out of action and started off in convoy to the WINGHE area.

8th Nov MAARHEEZE

    The march was continued on the 8th and the Regiment halted for the night near PEER, except for the 4th Super Heavy Battery RA which was to harbour near DIEST. The Regiment was placed under command of the 3rd AGRA. The next day the Regimental Headquarters 5th and 15th Super Heavy Batteries RA set off at 7 am to a concentration area near MARHEEZE. They were joined on the 10th November by the 4th Super Heavy Battery RA who had followed them independently.

    The 5th and 15th Super Heavy Batteries RA moved into action on the 12th as also did No. 2 gun of the 4th Super Heavy Battery RA. By the 13th at 2 pm the entire Regiment was ready to support operation "MALLARD".

18th Nov ASTEN

    During the following days Arty R shoots were carried out and Hostile Batteries were engaged by prediction. On the 17th orders were received for Regiment to move forward to the LOON-ASTEN area. They moved the next day to a harbour area, Regimental Headquarters just NORTH of ASTEN, 15th Super Heavy Battery RA to BEHELP and 4th Super Heavy Battery RA to LOON. At 8 o'clock on the 19th, 4th Super Heavy Battery RA moved its 8 inch guns into action in LOON. The arc of fire was to cover VENLO with the object of doing Arty R shoots to destroy the bridge across the MAAS. The other two batteries remained in harbour.

    Calculations for this shoot were made the day before. The angle between the line of fire and the line of the bridge was 21 degrees, the range was 27,000 yards and the dimensions of the bridge taken from air photographs were :-

Length 175 yards

Breadth 15½ yards

    It was therefore estimated, after taking into consideration the zone of the gun, that 19 per cent hits could be expected. 36 rounds were fired up to 3.30 pm when a halt was called as 28 Medium Bombers were on their way to bomb the bridge; they did not succeed in hitting the bridge, however, and at 4 pm another 10 rounds were fired at the target.

    Subsequent photographs seemed to prove that one span had been knocked down by 4th Super Heavy Battery's shooting.

21st Nov MEIJEL

    On the 20th at 8 o'clock, 5th and 15th Super Heavy Batteries RA came out of harbour and went into action in the MEIJEL area. At 3.15 in the afternoon orders were received that the 5th Super Heavy Battery RA were to switch their zero line approximately 50 degrees to the right in order to engage ROERMOND in their arc of fire. The Regiment was now able to support two concurrent operations, one by the 8th Corps and one by the 12th Corps directed against VENLO and ROERMOND respectively.

    The Regiment continued to fire destructive shoots and engage Hostile Batteries in support of both operations.

    On the 25th of November at 7 pm it was learned that the 4th and 15th Super Heavy Batteries RA were to come out of action and move to a new position at HELDEN. The remaining battery was to be adjusted by moving its arc to the left.

    On the 26th November 4th and 15th Super Heavy Batteries RA started to come out of action.

    On the 27th since operation "FARNHAM" in which the Regiment was to be engaged, was cancelled, 4th and 15th Super Heavy Batteries RA were stopped whilst on the road to their new positions and harboured for the night in NEERKANT and MEIJEL respectively, whilst the Regimental Headquarters remained at ASTIN.

    The next day the 4th Super Heavy Battery RA came into action at NEERKANT where they had harboured. 5th Super Heavy Battery RA was still at MEIJEL and Regimental Headquarters and 15th Super Heavy Battery RA moved to BERINGE. The whole Regiment was again in action.

    From this position an observed shoot was carried out on the 2nd of December on an enemy Observation Post in a water tower. Although previous attempts to destroy this tower with smaller calibre guns had been unsuccessful, the 15th Super Heavy Battery RA, who had been allotted 15 rounds per gun, scored eight direct hits, and subsequent fire for effect completed the destruction of the tower which caught fire.

    On the 6th of December a reconnaissance was carried out for new gun areas to the EAST of river MAAS, and careful attention, as usual, had to be paid to the roads and bridges on the route. On the 9th the Regiment again came under command of 9 AGRA and moved forward to come into action in this position; Regimental Headquarters at MELIOF. 4th Super Heavy Battery RA at SWELKHUIZEN, 5th Super Heavy Battery RA at GRACNT and the 15th Super Heavy Battery RA at KLING.

    This was prior to operation "SHEARS" in which, as previously stated, the Regiment was to be responsible for destructive shots against concrete defences which formed part of the SIEGFRIED LINE. Some shooting was done on the 10th and 11th of December with Air Observation Post and ground observation, but although there were many close rounds no direct hits were observed.

    The subsequent cancellation of operation "SHEARS" prevent further engagement of these targets; the fire being switched to Hostile Batteries.

Part 6

APPENDIX 1

APPENDIX 2

WEIGHT OF AMMUNITION

(PERIOD 17th July 1944 - 3rd MARCH 1945)

(a) Field

UNIT	25pr
	RPG	Rounds	Weight (tons)
79th Field Regiment RA	336	8,400	113

(b)Heavy Anti-Aircraft

UNIT	3.7 inch AA
	RPG	Rounds	Weight (tons)
108th Heavy AA Regiment RA	505	12,120	194
115th Heavy AA Regiment RA	32	768	12
165th Heavy AA Regiment RA	2,328	55,120	884
198/165th Heavy AA Battery RA	584	4,672	75
317/165th Heavy AA Battery RA	883	7,064	114
303rd Heavy AA Battery BA	61	488	9
2nd Heavy AA Regiment RCA	99	2,376	38
Totals	4,492	82,608	1,326

(c) Medium

UNIT	5.5 inch (100 lbs)			5.5 inch (80 lbs)
	RPG	Rounds	Weight(tons)	RPG	Rounds	Weight(tons_
9th Medium Regiment RA	6067	97072	5200	1325	21200	908
10th Medium Regiment RA	3837	61392	3297	939	15024	644
11th Medium Regiment RA	6509	104144	5579	1058	16928	725
15th Medium Regiment RA	214	3424	184	16	256	12
67th Medium Regiment RA	838	13408	719	137	2192	96
107th Medium Regiment RA	6416	102656	5499	761	12176	522
146th Medium Regiment RA	175	2800	150	48	768	32
Totals	24056	384896	20628	4284	68544	2939

(d) Heavy

UNIT	7.2 inch			155 mm
	RPG	Rounds	Weight(tons)	RPG	Rounds	Weight(tons)
1st Heavy Regiment RA	67	536	58	109	872	44
51st Heavy Regiment RA	1009	8072	865	879	7032	358
52nd Heavy Regiment RA	15	120	13	--	--	--
53rd Heavy Regiment RA	839	6712	719	357	2856	145
59th Heavy Regiment RA	648	5184	556	716	5728	257
Totals	2578	20624	2211	2061	16488	804

(e) Super Heavy

UNIT	8 inch			240 mm
	RPG	Rounds	Weight(tons)	RPG	Rounds	Weight(tons)
3rd Super Heavy Regiment RA	825	1650	117	683	2732	527

(f) SUMMARY

TYPE	RPG	Rounds	Weight(tons)
Field	336	8400	133
Heavy Anti-Aircraft	4492	82608	1326
Medium	28340	453440	23567
Heavy 7.2 inch	2578	20624	2211
Heavy 155 mm	2061	16488	804
Super Heavy 8 inch	825	1650	177
Super Heavy 240 mm	1417	2732	527
Totals	----	585942	28725

APPENDIX 3

(a) CASUALTIES

SHOWING THE CASUALTIES FROM 17th July 1944 -

8th May 1945

UNIT	Killed Offrs	Killed ORs	Wounded Offrs	Wounded ORs	Total Offrs	Total ORs
HQ 9 AGRA	----	3	----	6	----	9
9th Medium Regiment RA	1	11	1	14	2	25
10th Medium Regiment RA	1	----	----	25	1	25
11th Medium Regiment RA	----	6	2	25	2	31
107th Medium Regiment RA	----	22	2	44	2	56(sic)
738 Company RASC (Arty)	----	3	----	----	----	3
Miscellaneous	1	11	7	18	8	29
Total	3	56	12	132	15	188

APPENDIX 4

AN APPRECIATION OF THE 5.5 INCH GUN IN ACTION

    Whilst the AGRA was in ENGLAND it had taken a great deal of trouble with the maintenance of its guns and thus came to the theatre of war "gun proud". The guns had been in service in England for just about a year and had fired on average about 300 rounds of 40 EFCs per gun; during this time most of the firing at OTTERBURN, HUNSTANTON, LARKHILL, SENNYBRIDGE and ALFRISTON had been with Charge II.

    The AGRA had experienced one premature, the 10th Medium Regiment RA having one in February 1944 at Lewes. This occurred in the bore about 55 inches from the muzzle, the ammunition being 100lb shell with Fuze 119 Maxak.

    The guns were calibrated in March and did very little firing after that.

    Almost as soon as the Regiment arrived in the European theatre the guns were in action, with some firing at rate rapid and soon the EME was scouring the countryside for a gauge, measuring, bore, an impossible instrument to obtain in those days.

    The main trouble at this time were recoil system packings, the "L" rubbers of the buffer being the chief offenders, and the fitters gun were very busy persons indeed. The first casualty was experienced on the 18th of July when a gun of the 11th Medium Regiment RA was blown right out of the gun pit by a bomb which dropped outside the gun pit. It was a rather remarkable site to see a 5.5 inch gun weighing about 6 tons, lying on its back some five yards from the gun pit with the weight being taken by one balancing spring on the ground and the barrel resting against a tree trunk. The gun was evacuated to workshop and the only damage sutained(sic) was by the balancing gear.

    At the end of July the formation came under command of the First Canadian Army and an Advanced Workshop Detachment from Army Troops Workshop was allotted for the sole use of the AGRA. This AWD, run by a Captain RCEME, consisted of six teams with a Staff Serjeant(sic) in control of each, a stores section and an electric welding plant.

    Until this time the fitters gun and the LASs had done the maintenance work on the equipments, but now it was decided to institute a routine maintenance system with the object of putting two guns per regiment into the Advanced Workshop Detachment each week for thorough overhaul. This meant that each gun would be in the Advanced Workshop once every eight weeks and this policy was rigorously pursed. There is no doubt that very great benefit was derived from this maintenance scheme.

    In late August the start was made on a drive to get barrels slotted for rotation because serious local scoring had already been met in two guns. In both these cases the development of the score had been rapid and seemed to have been accentuated by using 80 lb shell with supercharge, cordite NS. In one case the total EFCs fired was 1,280 and the ovality was 0.030 inches, and in the second case 1,870 EFCs with an ovality of 0.043 inches.

    The limits of ovality for rotation (0.030 inches) were adhered to and frequent measurements were taken to observe the effect of rotation on reduction in ovality and retardation of scoring. Most of the guns had fired around 1,500 EFCs at this time and had slight scoring in the grooves at C of R and mainly at UP. There can be no possible doubt that the rotation put another 1,500 to 2,000 EFCs on the life of the barrels which would otherwise have been unserviceable due to scoring around 2,000 EFCs.

    An interesting experiment was carried out with barrels which had an ovality greater than 30/1000 inches and scoring at UP. Some were turned through 180 degrees and the scoring was definitely retarded. This seems to indicate that the 100 lb shell is a difficult one to ram and tends to leave an annulus at UP on the tail thus making a passage for a gas wash. This is also evidence by the fact that on the vertical axis, most of the wear takes place at UP. Two barrels sentenced "unserviceable" had the scoring portions cut out and the samples were most interesting. The metal had been eroded away by gas wash in a series of runnels in the rifling at UP to a width of about two and one half inches and a length of five inches and there was a smooth washing away in the chamber, fanning inwards to the C of R.

    Scoring was to be observed in the grooves at UP after about 250 to 300 EFCs and was parallel to the axis of the bore. As the scoring extended in length it cut into a land and a hole was then started because the gases had some outlet through which they could pass at high velocity. All the guns were then measured weekly and this enabled a check to be kept on rotation. It was found better to make a limit of ovality of 0.010 inches before further rotation rather than work to 250 to 500 EFCs.

    An interesting defect which showed itself in some barrels has hair cracks in the roots of the lands at the muzzle end. These extended for about two inches in length.

    There were a few crumpled trail legs and a number of trails were modified with re-inforcing plates. It is considered that the trail legs should be of stiffer design because it is very difficult at times to find a good bedding for the spades and the gun detachment will back up with any material handy, e.g. pieces of rock, although instructed not to do so. Efforts were made to limit the traverse to 20 degrees left or right, but this in itself was operationally difficult sometimes.

    The trouble of spread at the back end of the cradle was met and, this in conjunction with wear in the gun and recoilblock guides led to bending of the recuperator and buffer rods with consequent wear of the packing. Spreading of the cradle could be reduced by increasing the depth of the "U" shaped strengthening band. The fitting of new guides can be a very tedious job, and the carrying of a spare jacket and recoil block as a floater within the AGRA is thought to be a good thing so that the worn parts can be repaired and held in pool. The play in the guides has an effect on the securing of the top rail on the cradle, a number of loose rivets were found and the riveting work was not of the best.

    Another defect which later became apparent was the loosening of the set screws which secure the trunnion band to the cradle. There is no locking device on these set screws and when they become loose they are inaccessible unless the gun is stripped down.

    Another component which was a trifle troublesome is the breaking system. It is the practice to put the gun brakes on for the first few rounds until the spades are dug in, and unfortunately, the design is not robust enough to withstand the treatment brakes received by the gun number standing on the hand levers to get just a bit more out of the brakes.

    In ENGLAND the recoil systems were opened up and the amount of swarf found was rather alarming in some cases. A fair amount of swarf was also found in trail leg hinge pins. It is considered that inspection in the Ordnance Factories has not been as good as it should have been.

    There are two modifications which proved to be absolutely first class. They are, firstly, the fitting of needle bearing to the traversing rollers; there was a terrific amount of trouble with traversing on the Mark II carriages before these bearings were fitted, and, secondly, the strengthened elevating arc. A number of the old, light pattern arcs broke on firing and the bending of the elevating arc pinion spindle made itself a nuisance on two occasions, but no trouble was experienced with the heavier arc assembly.

    Another improvement to the equipment was the Crossley Neoprene obturator pad, particularly the Mark IA. If kept well greased, these pads gave no trouble at all and there are a number of Mark IA pads fitted in guns which have fired about 6,000 rounds and are still in service. The Mark II is not so good because of the nibbling which takes place and there are three scarfed joints to burn away.

    There were six prematures in the bore during operations in the theatre, two of them occurred with the 10th Medium Regiment RA whilst with 30 Corps. It is interesting to note that one No. 1 in the 10th Medium Regiment RA had three guns prematured and this rather lays the bogey at dirty ammunition because one feels sure that after the first premature a man would be careful, and after the second he would be extremely careful with the cleanliness and loading of his ammunition. The prematures sustained were tabulated in an effort to find a common factor in the incidence and the two factors common to all which emerged were 100 lb shell and Charge IV.

    Immediately the AGRA arrived in the European theatre a list of known possible causes of prematures was read to all gun detachments, stress being given to handling and loading of ammunition, and inspections and care of bores, and it is though that this may be partly responsible for the comparatively small number of prematures within the formation. Another point which may have had some influence was the cutting down of rates of fire very quickly to rate normal.

    An opportunity was made early in November to calibrate and all the guns shot well. One gun which had a mean wear of 0.138 inches, an ovality of 0.060, a local score of about one quarter of an inch in depth an had fired 3,400 EFCs was put alongside the standard guns to check the effect of the local score and ovality and the muzzle velocities obtained in feet/seconds were :-

Charge Super	1903
Charge IV	1606
Charge III	1290
Charge II	1105
Charge I	801

    Five of our guns had at the time of writing fired over 3,000 EFCs and were in the early part of the third quarter of life. It was encouraging to note how reliable and accurate was the shooting of these guns in their third quarter of life, and there is no doubt that the care taken of the equipment has more than proved its worth.

    When it is considered how much work was done by the guns in firing and travelling, from EVERECY though the CHANNEL PORT to the SCHELDT down to VENLO, and up to the Rhine it can be justifiably said that they behaved well and proved a first class battle winning weapon. When the various points which have emerged from this campaign are embodied in the re-design, the gun will be first class in every respect.

APPENDIX 5

AN APPRECIATION OF THE VEHICLES IN ACTION

    In the early days of the AGRA, vehicles were a nightmare and the EME's lot was not a happy one.

    However, the AGRA always took a pride in its transport even if they were crocks, and when, on mobilization, the new vehicles arrived, there was unbounded joy everywhere. The new BEDFORD 3 ton load carriers and the AEC MATADOR gun towers were nurtured in ENGLAND and when waterproofing time came much care was lavished on them. While in the European theatre there were very few vehicle casualties due to mechanical defects, most of the troubles were caused by accidents; lorries being pushed off the road and ditched, collisions in the dark and damage by enemy action.

    The main troubles were caused by MT 80 petrol, by the burning of valves. This was very acute on the BEDFORD 3 tonners and occurred around 5,000-6,000 miles. Replacement valves were difficult to obtain. Difficulty was experienced in some locations with the ammunition carrying vehicles. The 3 ton BEDFORD QL, whilst a 4x4 lorry, is considered to be under powered for this work and the RASC ARTILLERY Company's 3 ton 4x4 lorries were absolutely unable to make the gun positions on many occasions.

    The AEC MATADOR diesel tractor proved to be up to its job having overcome many very sticky positions and gave very little trouble either as a tower or as a recovery vehicle.

    The LADS breakdown vehicle on the War Establishment is a 3 ton 6x4 and is totally inadequate for its job. It is quite incapable of dealing with a suspended tow on a MATADOR tractor, and its scope for ordinary recovery is very limited as compared with a MACK or DIAMOND "T".

    Jeeps were indispensable, particularly in the early days when one was rather hemmed in. Its main defect was wear of the clutch plates, brought about by low gear work in convoy.

    The vehicles in the formation had done about 6,000 miles up to the end of December and they finished the campaign without undue trouble.

    The policy adopted in ENGLAND of an officer being in charge of stables and having himself to initial the Army Book 412, and the Army Book 406 inspections being done by selected officers, led to everybody concerned becoming "MT minded". This state of mind prevailed in the European theatre and the early training paid dividend as was shown by the fact that so few vehicles were off the road for mechanical defects.

APPENDIX 6

SIGNALS

    In an AGRA success depends largely on quick and accurate transmission of orders and information. To achieve this it is essential to have simple and reliable communications. In NORMANDY 9 AGRA set its hopes on good lines and robust R/T.

    The command net worked very satisfactorily throughout. An AGRA net always has a large number of outstations due to the number of representatives and links provided with Divisions. On some occasions there were as many as 20 outstations. The success of so large a net is due to the insistence in training and in war on a rigid adherence to wireless discipline and procedure, and a close understanding between the principal users i.e. the AGRA Staff, Adjutants and Assistant Adjutants.

    Line communications proved far more reliable than experience in training had led one to believe. A certain amount of difficulty was experienced in the bridge head mainly due to tanks, but provided lines were carefully built the time spent on maintenance was not excessive. It is very important during the initial deployment reconnaissance for the CAGRA to appreciate the line problem, and the practice in 9 AGRA was to give guidance to Regiments on the most suitable locations for Regimental Headquarters. This practice proved itself time and time again and telephone communications were first class.

    Multiple calls to Regiments were used a great deal in the formation with great success, but again success depends on a rigid adherence to discipline and the procedure adopted was normal wireless procedure. Lateral communication between Regiments were always laid and therefore there was normally at least three ways to each Regiment. It was not been unusuals(sic) to have as much as 80 miles of cable on the ground in many deployments of the AGRA, especially when additional Regiments were under command.

    Communications for the assault on SOUTH BEVELAND should be noted particularly. The AGRA was deployed on the mainland and maintained perfect wireless communication with six representatives on the AGRA Command Net with the Assault Brigade of the 52nd (Lowland) Infantry Division, and two representatives on the AGRA Net with the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division which was advancing up the Isthmus. Not only were the normal fire orders passed on this net, but a mass of detailed information for the Divisional Commander was obtained. A special feature of the layout of these communications was the land to sea to land conditions, and may have had a definite bearing upon the communications.

    The following points on equipment are of interest :-

    The 19 and 22 sets operated very successfully. However, as the Regimental Rear Links have high power sets, so also should the AGRA Command set be high power.

    The three 10 line switchboards were found totally inadequate, and it was essential to obtain a 40 line switchboard.

    The high power telephone is absolutely essential for conversation back to Corps and when necessary Army. A high power telephone was given to the Section by the First Canadian Army.

    The Jeep proved invaluable, but it is essential that the Section should get Jeeps for Despatch Riders; although the War Establishment was increased these were not obtained which meant that improvisations had to take place in borrowing Jeeps for this purpose.

    The 4.5-12 watt charging engine proved invaluable in the Regimental Signal Section, but its performance was not altogether satisfactory and out of the four engines of HQ 9 AGRA, three were condemned after three months in use.

    The most outstanding feature in the European theatre was the rapid replacement of cable. The formation worked with every Corps in the British and Canadian Armies and in every case the demand for replacement of cable was met within 24 hours. In view of the numerous successive deployments which 9 AGRA has made, it was rarely possible to recover cable and is an outstanding compliment to the efficiency with which the Chief Signal Officer's Branch dealt with this subject.

APPENDIX 7

SUMMARY

Date 1944	Army	Corps or Div	Battles and Locations	Regts under Command
9 Jul	.	.	Embarked London	9th,10th,11th,107th,146 Medium Regiments RA
12 Jul	.	.	Disembarked Arromanches	...
17 Jul	Second Army	12 Corps	EVERECY Putot-en-Bassin MALTOT	9th Medium Regiment RA 11th Medium Regiment RA
28 Jul	First Cdn Army	2 Cdn Corps 4 Cdn Armd Div	CAEN Giberville TILLY LA COMPAGNE Mondeville ROCQUANCOURT VERRIERS	9th,11th,107th Medium Regiment RA 108th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA
11 Aug	...	...	QUESNAY WOOD Tilly	9th,11th,107th Medium Regiment RA 108th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA
15 Aug	...	...	FALAISE Pont du Fresney Cingal	9th,10th,11th Medium Regiments RA 115th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA
18 Aug	...	...	FALAISE POCKET Clair Tizon, Sassy	9th,10th,11th Medium Regiments RA 115th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA
22 Aug	First Cdn Army	2 Cdn Corps 2 Cdn Inf Div	ORBEC Vimoutiers SEINE	9th,10th Medium Regiments RA
7 Sep	First Cdn Army	1 Corps	LE HAVRE	9th, 10th Medium Regiments RA 1st Heavy Regiment RA
13 Sep	First Cdn Army	2 Cdn Corps 3 Cdn Inf Div	BOULOGNE	9th,10th,11th,107th Medium Regiments RA 2nd Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA 51st Heavy Regiment RA
23 Sep	...	...	CALAIS CAP GRIS NEZ	9th,10th,11th,107th Medium Regiments RA 2nd Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA 51st Heavy Regiment RA
3 Oct	...	...	Eccloo SCHELDT POCKET Bentille	9th,10th,11th,107 Medium Regiment RA 51st Heavy Regiment RA 59th Heavy Regiment RA 3rd Super Heavy Regiment RA
23 Oct	...	...	SOUTH BEVELAND Lamswaarde	79th Field Regiment RA 9th, 10th Medium Regiments RA 51st Heavy Regiment RA 59th Heavy Regiment RA 118th,121st,174th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA
31 Oct	...	...	WALCHEREN Ijzendijke	61st Field Regiment RA 110th Field Regiment RA 9th,10th,11th,107 Medium Regiment RA 52nd Heavy Regiment RA 59st Heavy Regiment RA
11 Nov	Second Army	12 Corps 51 (H) Inf Div 53 (W) Inf Div	ROERMOND     Weert VENLO	9th,10th,11th,107 Medium Regiment RA 107th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA
18 Nov	...	...	VENLO    Heijthuizen	9th,10th,11th,107 Medium Regiment RA
26 Nov	Second Army	12 Corps 49(WR) Inf Div	Koningslust VENLO Cloister	9th,10th,11th,107 Medium Regiment RA
8 Dec	Second Army	30 Corps	MAAS POCKET Mustergeleen	107th Medium Regiment RA 165th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA 421/108th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA 3rd Super Heavy Regiment RA
13 Dec	...	12 Corps	MAAS POCKET Mustergeleen	9th,11th,107th Medium Regiment RA 165th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA 421/108th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA 3rd Super Heavy Regiment RA
21 Dec	...	12 Corps	MAAS POCKET Rumpen	9th,11th,67th,107th Medium Regiment RA 165th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA,51st Heavy Regiment RA 3rd Super Heavy Regiment RA
1945
3 Feb	First Cdn Army	30 Corps	THE RINE Haps	9th,11th,107th Medium Regiment RA 165th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA 53rd Heavy Regiment RA 3rd Super Heavy Regiment RA
18 Feb	...	...	THE RINE Gennap	9th,11th,107th Medium Regiment RA 165th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA 53rd Heavy Regiment RA 3rd Super Heavy Regiment RA
2 Mar	...	...	THE RINE Hassum	9th,11th,107th Medium Regiment RA 165th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA 53rd Heavy Regiment RA 3rd Super Heavy Regiment RA
21 Mar	Second Army	12 Corps	Sonsbeck RHINE CROSSING Xanten	9th,11th,107th Medium Regiment RA 90th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA 3rd Super Heavy Regiment RA

609/PSS/1 C/2200/8-45.